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Abstract: The essay addresses the meaning of boundary situations in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, as a turning point 
drawing on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy, and as a key for 
the comprehension of some of the differences in Karl Jaspers' philosophy regarding the thought of Husserl and Kant, 
respectively. For Jaspers, the meaning of boundary situations as a structure of Existenz underlines the possibility of 
risk in the individual historicity. Taking risks breaks the flow of reflection and, at the same time, appeals to an opening 
of ethics—without sacrificing the universality of Kant's categorical imperative. From Jaspers' point of view, Husserl's 
phenomenology does not open the possibility of self-transformation of the self, nor contributes it to the unfolding 
of the "inner action" of the transcending thinking, and since the boundary situations break the flow of the self-
reflective consciousness, tensions arising between consciousness and Existenz remain beyond the scope of Husserl's 
phenomenology. Similarly, as seen from Jaspers' position the meaning of Kant's transcendental method has become 
different after the clarification by the Existenz, which not only shows that thought is at stake in boundary situations, but 
also that Existenz at the same time puts its potentiality and its fate at stake.
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same objection to Husserl as he does to Descartes for 
they both attempt to validate the mathematics-based 
criteria of evidence and certainty for philosophy. 
Departing from his clinical expertise as a psychiatrist, 
Jaspers confronted the "deviations" of the pathologic 
psyche with the claims of coherence and meaning 
made by the phenomenology of consciousness,2 given 
de Los Andes, Revista Filosofia 25 (2014) 111-120. Thanks 
also to Helmut Wautischer and his editorial team 
from Existenz for their helpful editorial comments and 
suggestions regarding the revised present version.
2 See César Moreno, "De la excepción a la metafísica 
(Jaspers)," Madrid, Spain: Enclaves Fundamentales, 
Jaspers has emphazised that the philosophy of 
consciousness adopts a "contemplative" meaning on 
Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.1 He raises the 
1 A detailed account of this topic is in Gladys L. Portuondo, 
La existencia en busca de la razón (Apuntes sobre la filosofía 
de Karl Jaspers) [Existence in Search of Reason (Notes on Karl 
Jaspers' Philosophy)], Saarbrücken, Germany: Editorial 
Académica Española, Lambert Academic Publishing 
GmbH & Co. KG, 2012. With thanks to Pedro Coutin-
Churchman and Lauren Robinson Coutin for their help 
in correcting my English translation of the first English 
version of this article which was originally published in 
Spanish: "Jaspers, Husserl, Kant: las situaciones-límite 
como 'punto de giro'," Mérida-Venezuela: Universidad 
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the possibility for self-transformation of the self, nor 
contributes to the unfolding of the "inner action" of the 
transcending thinking—which according to Jaspers is 
a necessary condition for philosophizing. Transcending 
thinking is the place to which existential clarification 
belongs as the inclusive philosophical realm of 
boundary situations, and the place where the turning 
in Jaspers' philosophy occurs regarding to Husserl's 
phenomenology.7 "Actually," Jaspers states,
there exists a radical difference between the 
phenomenology of consciousness and the illumination 
of Existenz...it is described...as the leap from observing 
to philosophizing, that is, from knowing something to 
inner action through thinking. [RC 819] 
This method does not mean reaching some 
understanding (Verstehen)  of the ill psyche;8 that is 
to say, an interpretation of the connections that exist 
between mental states and the relationships and 
motivations that encourage them (PA 18). For Jaspers, 
who first introduced phenomenology into psychiatry,9 
this only constitutes an empirical method for defining 
and distinguishing mental states. 
Although since his Cartesian Meditations (1931) 
Husserl had shown his interest in the world of human 
beings— as a field of transcendental intersubjectivity 
and an opening of space to the lifeworld (Lebenswelt)—
it could be said, when seen from the position of Jaspers, 
that tensions were arising from the boundary situations 
between consciousness and Existenz as they remain 
marginalized in Husserl's phenomenology.10 This is 
7 Boundary situations as a "turning point" mean in 
the present context, firstly, an as critical as possible 
vision of Husserl's phenomenology and Kant's 
transcendental method by virtue of a displacement 
of philosophizing toward the existential realm, 
and, secondly, an enlargement of the contents of the 
philosophical perspective. In our view, boundary 
situations constitute in Jaspers' philosophy the main 
incitement for turning to the realm of Existenz.
8 The method of Verstehen or verstehende Psychologie was 
originally unfolded in Jaspers' General Psychopathology 
and, later, in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen.
9 Jaspers first discussion to using phenomenology 
in the context of psychiatry appears in 1912 in "Die 
phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der 
Psychopathologie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie 
und Psychiatrie 9/1 (December 1912), 391-408.
10 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An 
Introduction to Phenomenology, transl. Dorion Cairns, 
that the pursuit of truth in itself does not address a 
proper understanding of an ill consciousness due to the 
foundation of philosophy as a "rigorous science."
Since the scope of the phenomenology of 
consciousness as a method is restricted to describing 
particular phenomena,3 Jaspers decided to widen its 
scope and to use it to also describe the experiences 
of mentally ill people.4 He considers this latter only 
a subordinated method for providing descriptions,5 
and therefore as a method that is mainly suited for 
scientific research.6 Thus, even though he accepts it 
under no circumstances as a philosophical method, 
phenomenology allows him nevertheless to objectively 
represent phenomena of mental life, but it neither opens 
Fenomenología y Filosofía Existencial 1 (Editorial Síntesis 
2000), 167-87, here p. 170. [Henceforth cited as EMJ]
3 "Actually there exists a radical difference between the 
phenomenology of consciousness and the illumination 
of Existenz. This difference would be badly designated 
if one were to call it a return from consciousnes to 
what lies before consciousness and supports it: it is 
described more correctly as the leap from observing 
to philosophizing, that is, from knowing something to 
inner action trough thinking." Karl Jaspers, "Reply to 
my Critics," The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul A. 
Schilpp, La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company 
1981, pp. 747-869, here p. 819. [Hencefort cited as RC]
4 "Not only hallucinations, but also delusions, modes of 
ego-consciousness, and emotions could, on the basis of 
the patients' own descriptions, be described so clearly 
that they became recognizable with certainty in other 
cases." Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography, " 
The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, La 
Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company 1981, pp. 
1-94, here p. 18. [Henceforth cited as PA]
5 See Karl Jaspers, Psicopatología General, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, México, 1993, p. 58. In the English 
version, see: "It is wrong to call this book 'the principal 
text of phenomenology.' The phenomenological 
attitude is one point of view and one chapter has been 
devoted to it in some detail as the viewpoint is a new 
one. But the whole book is directed to showing that 
it is only one point of view among many and holds 
a subordinate position at that." German text: Karl 
Jaspers, General Psychopathology, Vol. 1, transl. J. Hoenig 
and Marian W. Hamilton, Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press 1997, p. 48.
6 "It was proved to be possible and fruitful to describe 
the inner experiences of patients as phenomena of 
consciousness....Phenomenology became a method 
for research" (PA 18).
Jaspers, Husserl, Kant: Boundary Situations as a Turning-Point 53
Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts
because the boundary situations break the flow of the 
self-reflective consciousness. If we follow Jaspers, then 
it is difficult not to take into consideration that the 
inherent limit of phenomenology as a philosophy of 
consciousness makes it impossible to move towards 
the philosophy of existence, since the latter must be 
inclusive with regard to all human potentialities. Jaspers' 
relationship with Husserl's phenomenology takes 
into account two basic circumstances: first, Existenz 
goes beyond consciousness (and also comprehends it), 
however phenomenology stays within the scope of the 
latter;11 second, Jaspers' philosophy calls for an ethical 
dimension of philosophizing leading thought to practical 
life—wherein the contemplative dimension of reflexivity 
is exceeded by the torn condition of the existent.
Drawing on Kant's transcendental method in so far 
as it aims to transcend what is objective (RC 792), Jaspers 
recognizes in this method the specific characteristic of 
the philosophical method which is distinct from the 
scientific method. Jaspers believes Kant reveals the 
way to Existenz, as it is open to self-reflection by the 
acknowledgment of: (1) the philosophical orientation 
toward the world without falling prey to deceptive 
illusions, as the way of science and knowledge of what 
is objective and as a basic condition of philosophizing; 
(2) the way of thinking which transforms the world into 
freedom and showing thereby that the world cannot be 
closed in on itself—being also incomprehensible as a 
whole for objective knowledge. Additionally, Jaspers 
states that the effort to transcend the subject-object 
split runs through science and objective knowledge. 
Kant keeps a similar stance regarding the relationship 
between science and philosophy, and he points out in 
Kant the idea of the world via antinomies and fallacies 
as a result of identifying it with a wholeness that 
incorrectly claims to exhaust the being of the world 
in its objectivity.12 For him, Kant would have taken a 
The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1977.
11 César Moreno, "Formas de lucidez. De las cosas 
mismas a la existencia," Madrid, Spain: Enclaves 
Fundamentales, Fenomenología y Filosofía existencial 1 
(Editorial Síntesis 2000), 15-46, here p. 35.
12 Karl Jaspers, "Doctrina de Kant sobre las Ideas", 
in Conferencias y ensayos sobre historia de la filosofía, 
Madrid, Spain: Editorial Gredos 1972, pp. 114-40, here 
pp. 114-5. [Henceforth cited as DKI, my translation] 
German text: Karl Jaspers, "Kants Ideenlehre," in 
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, Berlin, Germany: 
Springer Verlag 1971, pp. 463-86.
decisive step towards the possibility of the philosophy 
of existence, by providing the methodical foundation 
for the
idea of the phenomenality in correspondence with our 
existence within the subject-object duality, the latter as 
subordinated as forms of intuition to space and time as 
forms of intuition, and to categories as considered as 
forms of thinking.13 
Yet, while he defines the scope of the subject as 
incommensurable with the object's objectivity—which 
is rather set according to this scope as its necessary 
reference—Kant conceives the subject, at the same 
time, according to an universal human condition by 
addressing the structures of reason for all possible 
rational subjects.14 But the subject, conceived like this, 
stands in contrast with the singularity and uniqueness 
of the individual historicity, which decides and acts 
within the scope of possibilities as they are conditioned 
according to the occurrence of boundary situations. 
However, Jaspers follows Kant and emphasizes 
that it is impossible to think, unless that which is 
thought is objectified—and he also states that all the 
objectifications must be methodically canceled by the 
ceaseless transcending-thinking via contradictions and 
circular argumentations, expressing the elusiveness of 
what transcends the framework of the subject-object 
split, and leading thought to the limits of the thinkable. 
But in this case, according to Jaspers, these are limits 
(boundaries) as they are given within thought. Yet 
boundary situations cannot be the object of neither 
knowledge nor logical reasoning, but rather they only 
13 Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, transl. 
Ralph Mannheim, Philosophical Library, New York, 
1949, p. 14.
14 Jaspers examines Kant's Theory of Ideas by highlighting 
the ideas' special feature of being a content of the 
reason which surpasses the subject-object split. Jaspers 
also examines Kant's comments on the problem of "the 
one being," the individual, and by pointing out such a 
problem as not existing for the theory of categories (as 
it is unreachable to the understanding), Jaspers stresses 
that it is situated at a central place in the theory of 
ideas. He comments that for Kant, "the determination 
of all isolated entity is just an infinite task which is 
founded on the idea of totality of the experience," as 
well as "every individual is infinite" because "it is an 
idea as far as it becomes an object of knowledge" (DKI 
128). But Kant refers to the problem of the individual 
in the realm of reason, and does not in the realm of the 
Existenz.
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simultaneously he also thinks this conversion responds 
to the reality and the meaning of historicity, what Kant 
did not understand—so, following Jaspers, is that he 
had lost sight of the ethics of responsibility, with the aid 
of which Max Weber later develops his thinking later. 
Then, Jaspers stresses:
What, from the point of view of a philosophy of 
history, he [Kant] permits is merely the attempt to 
write a history in which it is shown in how far and 
in how far not -measured by the ideal of reason- the 
events and transformations which occurred were 
advantageous, and how all this is connected. [RC 755]
The dialectic of historicity (as an existential 
condition according to Jaspers) manifests itself in the 
the judgement is usually missing, it is not unusual 
to find highly educated men who, when using their 
scientific ability, let it display that irremediable lack 
[of the gift]" (CFP 17). Arendt refers the quote to 
Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B172-B173, transl. to 
Spanish: Crítica de la Razón Pura, Madrid: Alfaguara: 
Alfaguara, 1978. See the full quote in the official 
English version in: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, ed. and transl. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 
1998, pp. 268-9 as follows: "A dull or limited head, 
which is lacking nothing but the appropriate degree 
of understanding and its proper concepts, may be 
well trained through instruction, even to the point 
of becoming learned. But since it would usually still 
lack the power of judgement (the secunda Petri), it is 
not at all uncommon to encounter very learned men 
who in many fine pathological, juridical, or political 
rules in his head, of which he can even be a thorough 
teacher, and yet can easily stumble in their application, 
either because he is lacking in natural power of 
judgement (though not in understanding), and to be 
sure understands the universal in abstracto but cannot 
distinguish whether a case in concreto belongs under it, 
or also because he has not received adequate training 
for this judgement through examples and actual 
business." Arendt points out the significance of this 
issue for "a group of questions facing modern thought, 
particularly the problem of theory and practice, and 
for all the attempts to achieve a more or less plausible 
theory of ethics" (CFP 18). In his "Reply to my Critics", 
Jaspers states in his comment to Walter Kaufmann 
that Kaufmann's view, according to which "he thinks 
that I stand above all on the ground of the Critique of 
Practical Reason," is hardly correct. Rather Jaspers says 
that, although he knows this work, he has "repeatedly 
and thoroughly studied, and again and again thought 
through, only the other two Critiques" (RC 857).
drive the existential clarification.
In a similar way, one can say that while Kant's 
transcendental philosophy has adopted as a starting 
point the experience of knowledge's fulfillment 
according to the modern scientific reason—and it also 
critically examines the conditions for this possibility—
Jaspers' criticism begins with the de-realization, so to 
speak, of the empirical existence (Dasein) in a world in 
which the distinctive feature is the crisis. And it also 
examines the potential conditions of Existenz through 
the praxis, as they are unfolded by the existential 
clarification and communication. For Jaspers, the order 
of the Existenz cannot be found in any other than that 
of the very Existenz and it has an indirect meaning 
only,15 for the being of Existenz is mere possibility. When 
transcending-thinking "thinks about objects through 
non-objective ways; jumps over our own shadow by 
thought; thinks by methods using understanding and 
going beyond understanding" (RC 794), it performs the 
"basic philosophical operation" and makes it possible to 
change the attitude of consciousness, i.e., its conversion.16 
Jaspers considers thinking's conversion as a part of the 
formal transcending, or what amounts to the same 
thing, it is in accordance with the "order of reason."17 But 
15 Jaspers' referrals to the indirect meaning of different 
notions—for instance, the ciphers of transcendence, 
or the concepts and phenomenological descriptions 
of the Existenz—underline the impossibility to find 
an objective referent for these notions, given that they 
belong to a realm which exceeds the subject-object 
split within which knowledge is objectified.
16 The subject of the conversion of consciousness takes 
a core position in Karl Jaspers' thinking. A valuable 
study about the meaning of this conversion under 
the conditions of the Technological Revolution in the 
Modern Age can be found in Gregory J. Walters, Karl 
Jaspers and the Role of "Conversion" in the Nuclear Age, 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.
17 The "conversion of thinking" in Kant unfolds in the 
realm of logical operations, which do not include 
the judgment, as Hannah Arendt pointed out. She 
stresses that the judgment deals with the particular 
and has no place into Kant's moral philosophy. See 
Hannah Arendt's 1970 lectures Das Urteilen: Texte zu 
Kants politischer Philosophie, Piper, München, 1985. In 
Spanish, Hannah Arendt, Conferencias sobre la filosofía 
política de Kant, transl. Carmen Corral, Buenos Aires: 
Paidós 2003, pp. 16, 35. [Henceforth cited as CFP, my 
translation] Arendt quotes Kant: "A blunt or limited 
head...may reach by studying the very erudition by 
means of training. But considering that, in such a case, 
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objective history of the empirical existence (Dasein), 
it allows to identify any historic situation of what is 
empirically given as a boundary, and also creates the 
conditions for any historic existential possibility. "In any 
case," Jaspers points out,
what happens depends on man. There is nothing that 
might be considered as unavoidable, as fateful....Within 
us is what gets to be, and within every individual, 
definitely, although no individual can decide where it 
goes history's guidance.18
With regard to the human experience of boundary 
situations, it appears that the heterogeneity of the 
individual historicity is irreducible to the Kantian 
universal subject, not only due to its historical empirical 
manifestations, but also due to its existential potentiality.
For Jaspers, boundary situations (Grenzsituationen) 
do not constitute themselves a content of thought, but 
rather are the expression of the discontinuity and of 
the boundaries of the potential Existenz. If the factual 
situation defines the empirical existence (Dasein), the 
boundary situation defines the Existenz: According to 
Jaspers, to exist and to experience boundary situations 
"are the same thing,"19 and "the authentic function of the 
boundary" (F2 67-8) is to point out the Transcendence, 
while remaining immanent. Boundary situations have 
a historical (geschichtliche) characteristic for the potential 
Existenz and this is unique for the individual, although 
one cannot modify or suppress it, but can clarify it by 
way of active participation in it. The task of philosophy 
consists in the clarification of the Existenz according to 
the existential physiognomy of the individual, to the 
extent that it can open up and encourage the possibility 
of (self-) reflection within boundary situations and 
by making it possible to establish its scope. Death, 
guilt, struggle, suffering, and foundering as boundary 
situations express the finitude of the Existenz and, at the 
same time, its potentiality. Their meaning can only be 
communicated in a paradoxical way, as opposed to the 
empirical existence—to which the Existenz, however, 
has to hold onto, given that this is its only means to 
18 Karl Jaspers, Origen y meta de la historia, Revista de 
Occidente, Madrid, 1953, p. 166. [My translation] 
German text: Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der 
Geschichte, München: Piper, 1949.
19 Karl Jaspers, Filosofía, two volumes edition by Revista 
de Occidente, Madrid, 1959, Vol. 2, p. 67. [Henceforth 
cited as F followed by volume number. My translation] 
German text: Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, 3 Vols., Berlin, 
Germany: Springer Verlag, 1932.
manifest itself.
In Jaspers' view, the meaning of Kant's 
transcendental method has changed through the 
clarification by the Existenz, yet it remains an essential 
condition for this clarification. Following Jaspers, Kant's 
transcendental philosophy is at the centre of the question 
regarding the possibility by proposing the well-known, 
three metaphysical questions, related to knowing, 
doing, and believing. Departing from them, Jaspers' 
philosophy founded the method of transcending as 
transcendental possibility, whereby transcending does 
not allow to grasp any being, "but clarifies one feature 
of our empirical existence, in general" (F2 408). Further, 
his conception concerning the existential clarification 
contributes to the expansion of the transcendental 
method because it takes into account not only the realm 
of transcending into thinking—where Transcendence 
can be represented as an Idea—but also, at the same 
time, it refers to the transcending in the sense of an 
existential potentiality, just there where thought no 
longer transcends; that is, in the boundary situations. It 
is in this sense that the notion of boundary situations in 
Jaspers' philosophy represents a turning point directed 
towards the realm of Existenz regarding the philosophy 
of Kant, and the criteria that opens up a new scope for 
philosophical reflection.
It is not only apparent for the transcending thinking 
through the existential clarification that thought is at 
stake in boundary situations, but also that the Existenz 
puts at the same time at stake its potentiality and its 
fate. Self-reflection gives way, within the existential 
clarification, to the acceptance of or acquiescence to the 
judgments (affirmative or negative), and to resolutions 
through action. Jaspers stresses that the time of 
resolution always involves with regard to the Existenz 
the possibility of risk; in this way, from the point of view 
of the existential clarification, the scope of any rational 
ethics would be objectionable, if it is considered as a 
sufficient warranty for the right course of action—in any 
case, it can only support the restricted possibility for the 
prudent action, "since Existenz must decide on time and 
it cannot, arbitrarily and without interruption, check for 
the sake of prudence", says Jaspers, as "time compels":20
Existenz cannot wait...it must decide instantly each 
20 Karl Jaspers, La fe filosófica ante la revelación, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1968, p. 407. [Henceforth cited as FFR 
with my translation] German text: Karl Jaspers, Der 
Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Christlichen Offenbarung, 
Basel, Stuttgart: Helbin & Lichtenhahn, 1960.
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time, then it should run what only after an endless 
cognition would be clear and apparent, at the end of 
time...Existenz has to risk itself. And yet at the decision, 
at resoluteness, it stays on expectation of whichever 
comes. [FFR 407]
From the perspective of the temporality and 
historicity of the Existenz, Jaspers questions the Kantian 
claim, "do not risk anything, because of the material 
safety, to the possibility of being unfair" (FFR 407). 
This claim seems to be contradictory to the temporary 
condition of the human being, in which what is decided 
in a single instant is decided for eternity. Jaspers remarks, 
the Existenz knows that when acting, it might be unfair; 
or it may also fails to do the required action when it 
remains unmoved, regardless whether it by some event 
gets involved either directly or indirectly. From this 
could be inferred that, for Jaspers, the Existenz is not able 
to avoid its guilty condition via some rational ethics.
Boundary situations draw the unique outlines for 
the Existenz together with the transcending thinking, 
and this latter moves in circles; it seeks to break the 
siege by objectivities and boundaries; it is directed 
towards non-objectiveness, and it creates room for the 
potential Existenz. Jaspers goes further regarding the 
transcendental method, because clarification of Existenz 
is the goal for the transcending-thinking, which opens 
the possibility for the subject to become itself. And this 
constitutes "the ages-old secret of self-consciousness" (RC 
799). So the "method of transcending" does not only have 
a critical meaning for Jaspers' philosophy, but it also has 
an existential aim: "The general transcending, which is 
philosophically communicated, does not match with the 
existential transcending to oneself, and while it is true 
that philosophical thinking awakes it or corroborates it, 
this is not, in turn, carried out by it" (F1 55). In this way, 
philosophy cannot offer the protection needed in order 
to avoid every risk for the existential transcending.
Kant's method offers Jaspers a key to addressing 
the potential Existenz toward the performing role 
which corresponds to it; that is, to put at stake its 
potentiality; in such a case, a new attitude is required 
for the consciousness in the shape of a conversion or 
"re-birth of thinking" (RC 794) by appealing to the 
existential communication and clarification. The "basic 
philosophical operation" is carried out as a leap to a new 
level of thinking; and it is reached when, at the same 
time, the self-transformation for the subject who thinks 
is reached by so doing. The conversion of the way of 
thinking from intellectual thinking to comprehensive 
reason21—not only in the realm of theory, but also 
by way of its implications for practical action—is 
not a spontaneous process but rather, it transcends 
mere reflection via a willful decision, involving it 
in communicative participation. For Jaspers, the 
clarifying-thinking is an answer to a call from an ethical 
dimension, which is inherent in the unavoidable risk of 
existential realization.
Jaspers has exposed reason to all the risks of the 
Existenz. The existential clarification has been conceived 
by him not as an overcoming, but as an expression of 
the discontinuities, paradoxes, and boundaries, by 
which the problematic path of communicative and 
comprehensive reason unfolds. The encounter of the 
reason with the Existenz is never final, nor does it lead 
towards some sort of reconciliation in an impossible 
identity. Reason does not purport, as a retrospective 
view, to deliver judgment on the Existenz: Unlike 
Minerva's owl, it does not lift its wings at the nightfall. 
In an endless approximation, reason shows those 
polar conditions, without which the human condition 
cannot be realized. The existential clarification does not 
attempt to declare a theory of the being of the Existenz, 
but rather a criticism on human experiences—leading 
to the encounter with the Transzendenz.
Since only the self can execute this process, the 
basic philosophical operation always has an individual 
character, yet it is only achievable by means of 
communication. So, the conversion of consciousness 
has an inherent social dimension, which is linked to 
the historic conditions of the boundary situations, and 
also to the shared experiences of communities. And as 
Jaspers has pointed out, the change in attitude of the 
consciousness—which is generated by the potential 
Existenz while facing risks undergoing attempts to 
reach its realization—represents not only the entrance 
to the freedom of philosophizing, but it also lays bare 
the possibility for the failure on par with the unfettered 
conversion of thinking and existing.
21 The notion of "comprehensive reason," which is one 
of the cornerstones of Jaspers' philosophy, can be 
briefly construed, as the constant expansion of reason 
through the unlimited transcending of thought.
